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The Black Fourth Amendment
Charisma Hunter*
Abstract
Policing Black bodies serves at the forefront of the American
policing system. Black bodies are subject to everlasting
surveillance through institutions and everyday occurrences.
From relaxing in a Starbucks to exercising, Black bodies are
deemed criminals, surveilled, profiled, and subjected to
perpetual implicit bias when participating in mundane
activities. Black people should have the same protections as
white people and should possess the ability to engage in everyday,
commonplace, and routine activities.
The Fourth Amendment was not drafted with the intention
of protecting Black bodies. In fact, Black bodies were considered
three-fifths of a person at the drafting of the United States
Constitution during the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
During the period of Reconstruction in 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified to remedy racial injustices and to
provide Black people with equal protection under the law.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on whether the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause selectively
incorporates basic freedoms and rights outlined in the Bill of
Rights is nearly incomprehensible. For example, the Supreme
J.D. Candidate, Class of 2023, Washington and Lee University School of Law;
B.A. in Political Science, Class of 2019, Virginia Tech. I want to thank
Professor Brandon Hasbrouck for encouraging me to think broadly and outside
the four squares of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; Professor
Alexandra Klein for helping me navigate and understand the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; the incredible editors of the Washington
and Lee Law Review for making this publication possible; and to my
phenomenal family for instilling hard work and diligence in me.
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Court, in a piecemeal fashion, has found that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be construed to
require police and the judiciary to acknowledge and respect basic
rights found in the amendments, such as the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments. Yet, for over fifty years after the ratification of the
Reconstruction Amendments, the Court refused to acknowledge
that the Due Process Clause was designed to protect the rights of
individuals against the state.
The Black Fourth Amendment will repair and remedy the
discriminatory policing of Black bodies. The Black Fourth
Amendment will repair and remedy the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by creating a rebuttable presumption,
making prosecutors and the state prove that the officer had an
actual reasonable suspicion or probable cause basis to arrest a
Black person, instead of mere subjective ideas and preconceived
notions. Through this measure, the Black Fourth Amendment
will carry out what the Fourteenth Amendment’s enigmatic Due
Process Clause was intended to do—to incorporate substantive
due process rights, such as those rights outlined in the Fourth
Amendment, and to guarantee equal protection to Black people
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
“I can’t breathe.” Eric Garner was known as the
“neighborhood peacemaker.”1 On a hot summer day in Staten
Island, an unarmed Black man, Eric Garner, was placed in an
illegal chokehold by a police officer, losing consciousness.2 New
York Police Department Officers Daniel Pantaleo and Justin
D’Amico were called to the scene because of a fight that Garner
broke up.3 Pantaleo exchanged words with Garner regarding
Garner’s illegal sale of cigarettes, and subsequently placed
Garner in a chokehold.4 Garner pleaded “I can’t breathe” eleven
times before he was pronounced dead.5 Despite video evidence
recorded by bystanders, a Staten Island grand jury declined to
indict Officer Pantaleo and, in the end, then-Attorney General
Bill Barr decided to not seek a civil rights indictment against
the officer.6 The Justice Department cited the lack of evidence
provided to prove that Officer Pantaleo “willfully used excessive
force to violate Mr. Garner’s rights.”7 In response, Reverend Al
Sharpton spoke magniloquently about the American justice
system: “Five years ago, Eric Garner was choked to death; today
the federal government choked Lady Justice, and that is why we

1. Eric Garner Dies in NYPD Chokehold, HISTORY (July 15, 2020),
https://perma.cc/HJ9G-BLX8.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. (noting that the chokehold maneuver is against NYPD rules).
5. Id.
6. See Katie Benner, Eric Garner’s Death Will Not Lead to Federal
Charges
for
N.Y.P.D.
Officer,
N.Y. TIMES (July
16,
2019),
https://perma.cc/PU4T-EHWG (discussing the contentious debate over
whether to bring civil rights charges against the officer who murdered Eric
Garner).
7. Id.
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are outraged.”8 Lady Justice’s capacity to administer equal
justice for Black men has been restricted. The chokehold on
Lady Justice and Black men continues to plague the United
States.9
The United States makes itself known as the land of equal
opportunity for everyone.10 In the Gettysburg Address,
President Abraham Lincoln stated that the United States was
dedicated to the idea that “all men are created equal.”11 But the
history of the United States and current statistics provide a
different narrative. A 2016 study conducted by the Pew
Research Center found that Black people earn significantly less
income than white people and that the median net worth of
household wealth for white people is thirteen times the net
worth of Black people.12 The incarceration rate of Black people
is significantly higher than white people.13 This Note will
discuss how the United States has inadequately addressed
racial disparities and racist policing. In fact, the United States
has exacerbated the problem through the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.14
This Note particularly discusses the impact racist policing
has on Black men.15 Particularly, this Note emphasizes the
8. Id.
9. See generally Nirej Sekhon, The Chokehold, 57 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
43 (2018) (discussing Paul Butler’s evocative work on “the Chokehold,” a
metaphor for societal norms that disproportionately impact Black men).
10. But see Isabell V. Sawhill, Still the Land of Opportunity?, BROOKINGS
(Mar. 1, 1999), https://perma.cc/DM2B-5M2P (questioning whether the United
States deserves the reputation of being “the land of opportunity”).
11. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863),
https://perma.cc/MA7T-YEDL.
12. See On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds
Apart, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/XJN4-EMYA
(providing statistics of racial disparities and racial divides in the United
States).
13. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7,
12 (2011) (“The overwhelming majority of the increase in imprisonment has
been poor people of color, with the most astonishing rates of incarceration
found among black men.”).
14. See infra Part I.
15. Black women should not be forgotten. Black women have also fallen
prey to racist policing and the carceral state. Officers who kill Black women
with no accountability are similar to the officers who killed Eric Garner—they
escape liability. See KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET AL., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING
POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/XM86-
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implicit racism in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence when it
applies the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part I
comprehensively summarizes the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment and its incorporation against the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16
Additionally, Part I discusses in detail the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the intention of its
writers: to prevent discrimination on the basis of race.17
Understanding the spirit of the Fourth Amendment and the
implications of the Fourteenth Amendment is imperative for the
execution of the Black Fourth Amendment.18 Part II begins by
analyzing Supreme Court jurisprudence and the ways in which
it reified race, placing race outside of legal analyses when it
should be a factor in any Fourth Amendment inquiry.19 This
Note specifically discusses the bleak reality that Black men are
deemed criminals by virtue of their skin color. This reality has
been made apparent by the anecdotes and news stories which
discuss Black men being shot and killed for wearing black
hoodies while the Supreme Court granted the Ku Klux Klan the
right to wear their uniforms, Black men being seized and killed
for being in a predominantly white neighborhood, and Black
men being stopped and frisked for wearing designer shoes.20
Part II further discusses the consequences of Black skin serving
as a basis for reasonable suspicion, which include negative
psychological impacts on the Black community, residential
segregation, and mass incarceration.21 Part III discusses a
solution to racist policing and the Court’s inability to remedy it:
to add an additional amendment to the U.S. Constitution, titled
9AF9 (PDF) (“The lack of meaningful accountability for the deaths of unarmed
Black men also extended to deaths of unarmed Black women and girls in
2015.”). Far too many Black women have been subject to racist policing and
police brutality: Breonna Taylor, Tanisha Anderson, Atatiana Jefferson,
Monique Jenee Deckard, and, unfortunately, the list goes on. See Yelena
Dzhanova et al., 50 Black Women Have Been Killed by US Police Since 2015,
INSIDER (July 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/9757-8DS2 (listing the names and
tragic stories of Black women who had fatal encounters with police officers).
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
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the Black Fourth Amendment, making it a requirement for all
courts to consider the subjective intent of police officers when
they stop and frisk or search and seize Black men.22 In doing so,
prosecutors and the state will have to overcome a rebuttable
presumption that race and Black skin were used as a proxy for
reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk or search and seize Black
men, placing the burden on the state to prove otherwise. The
Black Fourth Amendment would ensure that the Fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment work together to
provide Black individuals equal protection under the law.
I.

THE MEANING BEHIND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.23

Under the Fourth Amendment, “searches and seizures”
affecting personal interests are only forbidden when they are
deemed “unreasonable.”24 Police officers are given an abundance
of discretion, however, and are therefore granted the ability to
conduct warrantless or subjective searches if the officer has
probable cause that an individual is subject to criminality. Stops
are likewise permitted if the officer has objectively reasonable
grounds to believe that the person is armed and dangerous.25
Substantive Fourth Amendment rules such as the situations in
which officers can frisk an individual are supposed to be
enforceable against police officers who violate them.26 But
“policing the police” by setting concrete standards for searches

22. See infra Part III.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 358 (1974) (synthesizing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and articulating its underlying meaning).
25. See id. at 360 (explaining the standards necessary for warrantless
searches or stop and frisks).
26. Id.
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and seizures and stop and frisks is a practice that the Supreme
Court consistently avoids.27
The Fourth Amendment was rarely cited in Supreme Court
cases until the exclusionary rule became applicable to the
states.28 The exclusionary rule is a principle under the Fourth
Amendment that prevents evidence unlawfully seized by police
officers from being used against a criminal defendant in a trial.29
Boyd v. United States30 was the starting point for litigating
under the Fourth Amendment, and the first Supreme Court case
to give the exclusionary rule footing.31 In Boyd, the Court held
that the certain materials were illegally obtained by the Federal
government, and thus the admission of the materials into
evidence was erroneous and unconstitutional.32 The Justices of
the Court saw the exclusionary rule as a mechanism to maintain
the Court’s integrity and legitimacy.33 Perhaps Justice Brandeis
articulated the Court’s stance in defending the exclusionary rule
the best, noting that the admission of such unconstitutionally
27. See id. at 370 (noting that most judges avoid “policing the police” as
it implies that judges are free to depart from their judiciary functions and
apply their own notions to policy). Historically, the Court has engaged in
“legislative default” in the regulation of police practices, despite Congress’s
lack of effort in police reform. See Wayne R. LaFave, Improving Police
Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule—Part II: Defining the Norms and
Training the Police, 30 MO. L. REV. 566, 568–67 (1965) (discussing the
deference courts give to legislatures in defining norms of police conduct).
28. See LaFave, supra note 27, at 580 (noting that more Fourth
Amendment cases were litigated once the exclusionary rule was applicable to
the states).
29. Exclusionary Rule, BRITANNICA (1998), https://perma.cc/LA36-JGYW
(last updated Feb. 7, 2020).
30. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31. See Scott E. Sundby, Everyman’s Exclusionary Rule: The
Exclusionary Rule and the Rule of Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace
the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L 393, 402–03 (2013) (noting that
the Supreme Court saw the exclusionary rule as a tool for enabling the
judiciary to enforce the rule of law).
32. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 639 (finding that evidence obtained
unconstitutionally was erroneously admitted by the trial court); see also
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 728 n.515 (1999) (explaining that the exclusion of the evidence in
Boyd extended to the void statute, and did not entirely articulate the modern
day exclusionary rule).
33. See Sundby, supra note 31, at 403 (emphasizing that the Court
believed that without the exclusionary rule the judicial branch would subject
itself to the illegality of admitting unconstitutionally obtained evidence).
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obtained evidence should be “denied in order to maintain respect
for law” and to “preserve the judicial process from
contamination.”34 Justice Brandeis also pronounced that the
government is “the potent, the omnipresent teacher,” and if the
“teacher” becomes a lawbreaker then it “invites anarchy.”35
Thus, the government must not be given the power to
unconstitutionally obtain evidence in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal, as this would “bring terrible
retribution.”36
In Weeks v. United States,37 the Court unanimously adopted
the exclusionary rule in its entirety.38 In Weeks, private
documents were seized from Fremont Weeks’ private dwelling
after police officers illegally searched his house without a search
warrant.39 The Court articulated that if private documents could
be illegally seized and used in evidence, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, which declares the citizens’ right to be
secure against searches and seizures, “might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.”40 Thus, the Court found that the private
papers should be restored to Weeks, and that a “prejudicial error
was committed.”41 Furthermore, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to state and governmental actors.42
The Supreme Court, however, later established that the
right of privacy and the exclusionary rule are at the core of the

34. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 484 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); see id. at 485 (“But the objection that the plaintiff comes with
unclean hands will be taken by the court itself. It will be taken despite the
wish to the contrary of all the parties to the litigation. The court protects
itself.”).
35. Id. at 485.
36. Id.
37. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
38. See id. at 392 (holding that the effect of the Fourth Amendment is to
secure the people “against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law”).
39. Id. at 386.
40. Id. at 393; see id. (“The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring
the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of
the land.”).
41. Id. at 398.
42. See id.
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Fourth Amendment43 and are enforceable against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.44
Arguably, the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment through
the Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights which may
not be explicitly mentioned in the first eight amendments of the
Bill of Rights because “due process is not delimited by the Bill of
Rights.”45 Indeed, the Court recognized the problems of police
incursions into the privacy of citizens.46 But the Court in Wolf
did not provide a method or an answer to enforce “such a basic
right.”47 The Court stated:
How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what
remedies against it should be afforded, the means by which
the right should be made effective, are all questions that are
not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying
solutions which spring from an allowable range of judgment
on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.48

The Court’s unwillingness to provide a remedy for Black
individuals to combat racist policing set the stage for the White
Fourth Amendment.49 Despite the lack of discussion of race in

43. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28, 30–33 (1949) (holding that
the exclusionary rule itself was not an appropriate mechanism to enforce the
Fourth Amendment against the states, yet the security of one’s privacy against
police intrusion is “implicit in the concept of liberty,” and thus the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause).
44.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (“Since the Fourth
Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government.”); Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (finding that the
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states by the same standard
which prohibits unreasonable search and seizures).
45. Robert L. Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The Burger Court and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 215, 229
(1975); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
includes the incorporation of part of the Bill of Rights).
46. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28 (noting that state-sanctioned police
incursions into privacy would run against the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
245, 245–46 (2010) [hereinafter Butler, The White Fourth Amendment]
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the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the White
Fourth Amendment brings to bear the mass incarceration of
Black people by granting a significant amount of discretion to
police officers and prosecutors.50 Additionally, the White Fourth
Amendment reinforces the frame of mind of neighborhood
security, police officers, and business owners—that Black men
are inherently dangerous and prone to criminality, and white
people are innocent.51
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporates the Fourth
Amendment
Slavery of Black people permeated the original
Constitution, from its provisions stating that slaves were
three-fifths of a person to the Fugitive Slave Clause.52 The
thirty-ninth Congress fundamentally changed the Constitution
by passing the Reconstruction Amendments, which were
constructed to limit the judiciary’s decisions that
disproportionately affect people of color.53 The second and third
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment state that “[no state
shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”54
Supreme Court precedent discussing the incorporation of
the first six amendments and the Eighth Amendment of the Bill
of Rights by way of the Fourteenth Amendment is confusing and

(arguing that the Fourth Amendment protects “white only” space and expands
the power of the police to work against people of color).
50. See id. at 247 (emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment
accomplishes its racial projects partly by giving broad discretion to police and
prosecutors).
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
53. See Alexander Tsesis, Enforcement of the Reconstruction
Amendments, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 852 (2021) (analyzing the balance
of congressional and judicial powers granted by the Reconstruction
Amendments); see also Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1857) (holding that
Dred Scott was not a citizen “in the sense in which that word is used in the
Constitution” and therefore lacked the privileges and immunities of
citizenship, including the ability to sue in federal court).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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incoherent.55 However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process
Clause, to incorporate most of the first eight amendments of the
Bill of Rights against the states.56 In Mapp v. Ohio,57 the Court
found that the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against
invasions of privacy by state actors is enforceable against the
states.58 The Court essentially stated that virtually every right
in the Bill of Rights is incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause:
[b]ecause [the Fourth Amendment right to privacy] is
enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other
basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police
officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment.59

In a more recent case, Timbs v. Indiana,60 Justice Gorsuch
had a similar understanding of incorporation,61 although he

55. See generally, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
(limiting the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to federal rights); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(limiting the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the federal government);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the
states).
56. The Seventh Amendment is excluded. See generally, e.g., Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (First Amendment
freedom of speech and freedom of the press); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (First Amendment prohibition on prior restraint); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964) (Fourth Amendment standard for obtaining a warrant),
overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884) (refusing to extend the Indictment Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Parker v. Gladden,
385 U.S. 363 (1966) (Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury and
Confrontation Clause); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment).
57. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
59. Id.
60. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
61. See id. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (referring to Justice Thomas’s
argument that “the ‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’
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wrote that the appropriate vehicle for incorporation of the Bill
of Rights against the States is the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Nonetheless, Justice
Gorsuch found that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
states to respect the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
excessive fines.63
The history of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment portrays the constitutional change—
”[i]t expanded legislative authority to pass statutes, the
executive’s to regulate, and the judiciary’s to review.”64 Through
judicial review, the judiciary became the key for formulating
equitable remedies for discrimination.65 The Supreme Court
began making structural changes in 1954, when it wrote its
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.66
II.

BLACKNESS AS THE BASIS FOR REASONABLE SUSPICION
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.

Justice Horace Gray67
include, at minimum, the individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights”
(citation omitted)).
62. Id.
63. See id. (explaining that, regardless of the vehicle for incorporation,
the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
64. Tsesis, supra note 53, at 873.
65. Id.; see also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80–82 (1872)
(holding that a citizen’s “privileges and immunities,” protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment against the states, were limited to the guarantees in
the Constitution). Justice Miller, the drafter of the majority opinion, left it to
the states to protect the “privileges and immunities” subject to Article IV of
the Constitution and its nondiscrimination rule. Id. at 78–79. After the
Slaughter-House Cases, the Court began using the Fourteenth Amendment as
a basis for judicial scrutiny. WILLIAM A. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL, POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32 (2015).
66. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (applying the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to hold that the “separate
but equal” doctrine was unlawful).
67. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1981).
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The first question in the analysis of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence through the lens of policing is whether the Fourth
Amendment is implicated by police conduct that constitutes a
search or seizure.68 If the Fourth Amendment is implicated by
police conduct that constitutes a search or seizure, the second
question is whether that search or seizure is reasonable, or
whether there was probable cause to justify it.69 A search is
defined as conduct by officials that intrudes upon a person’s
expectations of privacy; therefore, the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection extends to any area in which an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.70 To justify a
search, an officer must have probable cause that what is being
searched has evidence of a crime, or “a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt.”71 Therefore, for there to be probable cause to
justify an arrest or seizures of items, “facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge” must be “sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.”72
In Terry v. Ohio,73 the Supreme Court found that the Fourth
Amendment was applicable to stops—brief detentions of
individuals who are deemed suspicious—and to frisks—
pat-downs of the individual to determine whether the individual
is armed and dangerous.74 In acknowledging that the Fourth
Amendment applies to stop and frisks, the Terry Court
68. See Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry
v. Ohio’s Pathway to Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508, 1517 (discussing
the trigger and justification questions used in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).
69. Id.
70. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (discussing the two-fold rule in determining an individual’s right
to privacy).
71. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); see id. at 175–78
(discussing the probable cause standard).
72. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); see also Kremen v.
United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347 (1957) (discussing the standard when
analyzing whether an item was seized).
73. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
74. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 478–79 (2008).
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articulated that the necessary level of suspicion for stop and
frisks should be reasonable suspicion, a considerably lower
standard than probable cause.75
Under the reasonable suspicion standard for stop and
frisks, when police conduct a stop they must have reasonable
suspicion that the individual they stopped was engaged or
engaging in criminal activity, and when police conduct a frisk,
they must have reasonable suspicion that the individual
accosted was armed and dangerous.76 When the court makes the
determination of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion
to conduct a stop and frisk, the court looks to the “totality of the
circumstances.”77 Based on the totality of the circumstances, the
detaining officer must have a “particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.”78 In determining whether the officer had a
particularized and objective basis for conducting the stop, courts
consider the officer’s evidence and information which points to
the particular individual they stopped and why they chose to
stop that individual.79 As discussed in detail below,80 the issue
with this inquiry set out by the Supreme Court is that it only
examines whether the actions taken by the police officer are
objectively justified based on the facts sufficient to amount to
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.81 Therefore, courts
decline to examine the actual motivations, or the subjective
intent of the officer.82

75. Id. at 479.
76. See id. (noting that the reasonable suspicion standard has not been
precisely defined).
77. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“But the
essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances—
the whole picture—must be taken into account.”).
78. Id. at 417–18.
79. See id. at 418 (discussing the evidence needed for a police officer to
justify a stop).
80. See infra Part II.A.
81. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (noting that
probable cause is fluid and incapable of precise definition, and thus depends
on the facts drawn from the officer).
82. See id. at 366 (“[A] court must examine the events leading up to the
arrest, and then decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable
cause.” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).
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Historically, the Fourth Amendment has not been applied
equally. There is a clear link between race and the Fourth
Amendment—evidence of targeting minorities is apparent and
provides solid information on individuals stopped by police
officers on the basis of race.83 However, as discussed below, the
Supreme Court has historically separated racial concerns of the
Fourth Amendment by focusing on the objective intent of police
officers, despite race based targeting.84 In sum, a Fourth
Amendment analysis includes weighing a host of factors such as
the exact text of the Fourth Amendment,85 expectations of
privacy,86 and whether a suspect poses a threat to the public.87
The various criteria play a role in discerning whether police
officers have violated the Fourth Amendment, but the impact of
race and implicit bias simply does not.88 Therefore, determining
whether a search or seizure is reasonable can disguise
preconceived notions and assumptions about the criminality of
Black people.89
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court examined the
authority of police officers to stop and frisk an individual based
83. See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV.
331, 362 (1998) (“[E]vidence of racial targeting provides concrete and objective
information on the racial populations of motorists stopped by police officers.
Absent a race-neutral explanation, this evidence shows that police officers are
targeting black and other minority motorists in an arbitrary and biased
fashion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
84. See id. (noting that the Court refuses to scrutinize race-based
pretextual stops).
85. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (concluding that
the protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” does not extend to open fields).
86. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 210 (1986) (contemplating
objective criteria in discerning whether Ciraolo’s Fourth Amendment
protections were violated); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177
(1984) (“The Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of
privacy, but only those ‘[expectations] that society is prepared to recognize as
“reasonable.”‘” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))).
87. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the officer or others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to
prevent escape by using deadly force.”).
88. Maclin, supra note 83, at 371.
89. See id. (noting that the reasonableness standard can cover unspoken
fears about law enforcement and those “enmeshed in confrontations” with
police officers).
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on the officers’ suspicion that the individual might be engaging
in criminal activity.90 In Terry, a Cleveland detective saw two
Black men, John Terry and Richard Chilton, on a street corner
and claimed that the two walked back and forth along the same
route, stared into the same store window, and then congregated
on a street corner with a third man.91 The detective followed and
confronted the three men, believing that they were “casing a job,
a stick-up,” and after asking the suspects to identify themselves,
subsequently spun Terry and patted him down.92 The detective
found pistols in Terry and Chilton’s overcoats.93 Terry and
Chilton were both charged with carrying concealed weapons.94
At the motion to suppress, the prosecution argued that the
weapons were seized following a search incident to a lawful
arrest.95 The trial court rejected the prosecution’s argument but
denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the pistols, finding
that the officer had “reasonable cause to believe that the
defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some
interrogation should be made of their action.”96 Chilton and
Terry waived jury trial and pleaded not guilty, and the trial
court adjudged them to be guilty, and the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Judicial District affirmed.97 The Supreme Court of
Ohio dismissed the defendants’ appeal, finding that there was
no “substantial constitutional question.”98 Terry appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.99 On appeal, the Court
confronted the issue of “whether it is always unreasonable for a
policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search
for weapons unless there is probable cause for arrest” under the

90. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1968) (finding that a reasonable
person would have believed Terry was engaging in suspicious behavior and
thus the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
91. Id. at 5–6.
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id. at 7.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 7–8.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5 n.2 (explaining that Chilton passed away following the grant
of the writ of certiorari).
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Fourth Amendment.100 To decide whether the search and
seizure were unreasonable, the Court had to determine (1)
whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and (2)
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
that justified the interference in the first place.101
Using a flawed line of reasoning, the government argued
that the right to investigate a citizen gives rise to the right to
conduct a reasonable search of a citizen to protect the safety of
police officers.102 Terry, on the other hand, argued that stop and
frisks should be subject to probable cause.103 Thus, according to
Terry, it is unreasonable for an officer to search a suspect until
the situation evolves to a point where there is probable cause to
make an arrest.104 Chief Justice Warren delivered the majority
opinion of the Court, holding that a search is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment “where a police officer observes an
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that a criminal activity may be afoot and that
the person whom he is dealing with may be armed and
dangerous.”105 Accordingly, any weapons seized may be properly
introduced into evidence.106
Chief Justice Warren began his analysis by focusing on “the
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private
citizen.”107 He further explained that there is “no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or

100.
Id. at 15.
101. See id. at 19 (noting that there is no question to whether the officer
seized the petitioner and subjected him to a search—the inquiry was whether
it was reasonable for the officer “to have interfered with petitioner’s personal
security as he did”); see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)
(Fortas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court has historically “refused to
permit the use of articles from a seizure which could not be strictly tied to and
justified by the exigencies” that excused a prior warrantless search).
102.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1968).
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 30.
106. Id. at 30–31.
107. Id. at 21. (emphasis added).
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seizure) entails.”108 In justifying the intrusion of an individual’s
person, the police officer must be able to point to articulable
facts “taken together with rational inferences from those facts,”
to reasonably warrant the intrusion.109 The specific and
articulable facts are weighed against an objective standard—
one must ask whether “the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action was
appropriate.’”110 The Court emphasized that an officer should
have discretion when they are justified in believing the
individual whose suspicious behavior they are investigating is
presently dangerous to the officer or others.111 Terry thus
established that officers are permitted to stop a person for
questioning when they have reasonable suspicion that the
person is presently dangerous, even if that suspicion does not
amount to the probable cause necessary to effectuate an
arrest.112
The Supreme Court has, maybe inadvertently, played a role
in exacerbating racial discrimination. The narrative Chief
Justice Warren articulated has served as an underlying basis
for unreasonable search and seizures of Black people by setting
108. Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37
(1967)).
109. Id.; see id. (emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment becomes
meaningful when it is assured that at some point the officers can be subjected
to the neutral scrutiny of the judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of
the search or seizure in light of the circumstances).
110. Id. at 22; cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (finding
that the officers were justified in their search and seizure as the facts and
circumstances within their knowledge were sufficient to warrant a man of
reasonable caution that liquor was being transported); Beck v. State of Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (concluding that the officer acting in good faith is not
enough, as a subjective good faith test would evaporate the protections of the
Fourth Amendment).
111. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (reasoning that if the officer
is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating is presently dangerous, it would be unreasonable to deny the
officer the power to take measures to determine whether the person is carrying
a weapon).
112. See Peter A. Lyle, Racial Profiling and the Fourth Amendment:
Applying the Minority Victim Perspective to Ensure Equal Protection Under the
Law, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 243, 252 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s
reasoning creates problems for minority plaintiffs in civil rights actions as it
ignores racial perceptions).
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the stage for a “good faith” exception113—Black people are
deemed suspicious, that is, presently dangerous, in everyday
encounters by virtue of the color of their skin and having
characteristics that are deemed inferior. Indeed, in United
States v. Leon,114 the Burger Court concretely reflected the
ideology of the Warren Court by modifying the exclusionary rule
to permit the introduction of evidence so long as it was obtained
in good faith.115 The Leon Court concluded that the “marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained
in objectively reasonable reliance . . . cannot justify the
substantial costs of exclusion.”116 In doing so, the Court created
an exception to the probable cause requirement—the search and
seizure is valid so long as the police officer executed in a
reasonable manner and in “good faith” of a facially valid
warrant.117 This exception disproportionately affects Black
people, given that the officer may have “good faith” that the
Black individual is engaging in criminal activity, based on his
pretextual ideals.118 In other words, being Black while engaging
in typical activities creates a basis for reasonable suspicion and
probable cause under the Terry regime.119
Chief Justice Warren himself acknowledged the prominent
tension between Black communities and police officers even as
113. See Susan F. Mandiberg, Twists in the Use of Warren Court Fourth
Amendment Rhetoric: Searches, Reasonableness, Good Faith, 51 U. PAC. L.
REV. 789, 816 (2020) (describing the Court’s journey to a “good faith” exception
to the Fourth Amendment through “the elimination of judicial integrity as a
reason to exclude evidence obtained” unconstitutionally and “the combination
of the . . . rationale of deterrence with the notion of an officer’s subjective good
faith”).
114. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
115. See id. at 920 (finding that in most cases involving a search and
seizure, the police officer is not engaged in illegality).
116. Id. at 922.
117. Id..
118. See Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While Black: Distinguishing
Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1815 (2000)
(emphasizing that a Black male engaging in typical activities such as walking
down the street or driving his car faces a “greater likelihood of pretextual
police stops”).
119. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion, the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.”).
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he undervalued the exclusionary rule as a rights-protective
deterrent tool.120 In fact, he cited a 1967 report issued by the
President’s
Commission
on
Law
Enforcement
and
Administration of Justice which found that the misuse of
interrogations increase as police departments adopt aggressive
patrol strategies in which officers are encouraged to stop and
question persons on the street whom they deem suspicious.121
He further reasoned that this exacerbated police-community
tensions, particularly in situations where the stop and frisk of
minorities is “motivated by the officers’ perceived need to
maintain the power image.”122 Yet, he reasoned that no judicial
opinion could “comprehend the protean variety of the street
encounter.”123 The Chief Justice did not view this case as one
that could be directly transformative for minorities in altering
the White Fourth Amendment to work justly for them, but as
one that would relax the vigorous application of the exclusionary
rule.124 Instead, Chief Justice Warren favored the procedural
standard of the exclusionary rule that courts continue to
embrace today: (1) the government finds incriminating evidence
against the defendant, (2) prior to the trial, the defendant will
move to exclude that evidence by invoking the exclusionary rule,
and (3) the government will argue that the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated and, thus, the
incriminating evidence should be admitted.125 The Chief Justice
asked the wrong question when addressing whether the
exclusionary rule could be helpful in deterring racial
120. See id. at 14–15 (“The wholesale harassment by certain elements of
the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes,
frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from
any criminal trial.”).
121. Id. at 14 n.11 (citing PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON L. ENF’T & ADMIN. OF
JUST., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)).
122. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
123. Id. at 15.
124. See id. at 13 (discussing the limitations of the exclusionary rule and
how it cannot be invoked to exclude evidence that was discovered during a
legitimate police investigation); see also Butler, The White Fourth Amendment,
supra note 49, at 246 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is a project of some
Supreme Court Justices—including Chief Justice Warren—to expand the
power of police against people of color).
125. See Carbado, supra note 68, at 1530 (noting that the dominant
rationale for the exclusionary rule has been deterrence of unconstitutional
police behavior).
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harassment.126 As Devon Carbado correctly articulates, the
question should have been “whether a reasonable suspicion
standard would encourage [racial harassment policing].”127
Perhaps focusing on the injustices that minorities face was
too radical in the late 1960s—at the tail end of the Civil Rights
Movement—and thus the Chief Justice worked his way around
addressing the issue of policing minorities. Or perhaps, he found
it easier, in fear of the other Justices disagreeing or societal
backlash, to incorrectly place the policing of Black men in a
category that reflects what the White Fourth Amendment was
intended to be: a mechanism in which the factor of race is not a
part of any Fourth Amendment analysis.128 Or maybe the
Supreme Court consistently favors discretion within the
criminal legal system and sacrifices Black people in order to
preserve that discretion.129 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Warren
created a deficient and partial legal regime that provides police
officers with a constitutional mechanism under the Fourth
Amendment to harass Black men.130
A Black man stopping at a stop sign in a “high drug area”
for more than twenty seconds is, under the White Fourth
Amendment, a sufficient and valid basis of action used as
pretext for pursuing investigatory agendas.131 In Whren v.
United States,132 two police officers of the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling southeast D.C.

126. See id. at 1532 (recalling that Chief Justice Warren believed that the
exclusionary rule could do little to solve racial harassment because officers
who harass minorities do not have an interest in gathering evidence).
127. Id.
128. See id. (critiquing the Chief Justice’s “wholesale harassment”
argument for lacking nuance and being too narrow on racially harassing
policing); see also Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, supra note 49, at 247
(explaining the character and intentions of the White Fourth Amendment).
129. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 290–91 (1987) (holding that a
study indicating a discrepancy in the use of the death penalty correlated with
race was not a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias, and thus
Georgia’s capital sentencing process did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
130. Carbado, supra note 68, at 1525–26; see id. at 1533 (arguing that
Chief Justice Warren made a special effort to implement a legal regime that
gave officers a constitutional mechanism to engage in wholesale harassment).
131. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
132. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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for drug activity.133 The plainclothes officers, in an unmarked
car, became suspicious when they passed a Nissan Pathfinder
truck with temporary license plates which contained two Black
“youthful” occupants at a stop sign.134 The truck remained
stopped at the intersection for more than twenty seconds, and
when the police officers executed a U-turn in order to head
towards the truck, the truck turned right “without signaling and
sped off at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.”135 When one of the officers
went to the driver’s window, he observed plastic bags of what
appeared to be crack cocaine in Whren’s hands.136 Whren was
subsequently arrested and charged with violating drug laws.137
At the pretrial suppression hearing, Petitioners argued that
(1) the stop was not justified by probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that they were engaged in illegal drug activity, (2) the
officers’ justification for approaching the vehicle was pretextual
because Petitioners were Black, and (3) the officers made a
decision on who to stop based on the race of the occupants.138
The district court denied the suppression, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions, finding that an officer’s
subjective intent is irrelevant so long as a reasonable officer in
the same circumstances could have stopped the vehicle.139 At the
Supreme Court, Whren argued that probable cause should not
be enough to stop a vehicle, as police officers will be tempted to
use traffic stops for other investigatory matters; in order to
avoid this, he argued, the Fourth Amendment inquiry for traffic
stops should be whether a reasonable officer would have made
the stop for the reason alleged.140 Chiefly, Whren argued that
there is an inherent balancing test in any Fourth Amendment
133. Id. at 808.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 808–09.
137. Id. at 809.
138. See id. at 809–10.
139. See id. at 809 (quoting Whren v United States, 53 F.3d 371, 374–75
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
140. Whren accepted that the officer had probable cause to believe that the
traffic codes were violated. Id. at 810. Whren argued, however, that “in the
unique context of civil traffic regulations” probable cause is insufficient since
traffic is “so minutely regulated that total compliance” with the traffic laws
would be nearly impossible and the police officer will almost always have an
ulterior motive. Id.
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analysis, which requires the Court to “weigh the governmental
and individual interests implicated in a traffic stop.”141 As
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reliably morphed
Whren’s argument, he stated that the real question for the
Court, if up to the Petitioners, would be “whether (based on
general police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer
had the proper state of mind.”142 But, according to the majority
opinion, if probable cause exists, this balancing test should be
utilized only when the search or seizure in question was
conducted in an “extraordinary manner.”143 Thus, the power of
police is broadened, and an officer has the power to stop anyone
who commits a traffic violation, arrest them without violating
any constitutional guarantees, and then conduct a search of the
car and its occupants.144
The Whren Court first noted that the constitutional basis
for objecting to discriminatory application of laws falls under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not
the Fourth Amendment.145 The Court went on to state that the
Fourth Amendment analysis applied by courts has no elements
of subjectivity and is so fundamentally objective that where
141. Id. at 816.
142. Id. at 814; see id. (criticizing Petitioner’s proposed standard for an
officer’s reasonable suspicion, finding that although the standard did not use
the term “pretext,” it was designed to combat only the perceived “danger” of
the pretextual stop).
143. Id. at 818 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984);
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)).
144. See M.K.B. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 109, 117 (2009) (emphasizing the methods in which the Court has
broadened police authority to stop and search motorists who are typically
Black and the far-reaching implications of Whren).
145. Whren v. United States, 571 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Proving an equal
protection claim, however, is nearly impossible in the criminal context. See
Christopher Hall, Note, Challenging Selective Enforcement of Traffic
Regulations After the Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v. United States,
United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police Discretion, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1083, 1085, 1105 (1998) (discussing Justice Scalia’s relegation of
questions of racial bias to the Equal Protection Clause and how police bias may
not be concrete enough to satisfy equal protection requirements under the
Court’s jurisprudence, anyway). But, as discussed below, see infra Part III,
courts should incorporate equal protection principles into the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness analysis, which would allow courts to consider the
pretextual motives of police officers.
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there a legitimate search or seizure occurred, it can never be
invalidated, even if there is a possibility that the search or
seizure was motivated by racial animus.146 Thus, the Court asks
whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action
in question.147 Accordingly, the Court has concluded that “the
Fourth Amendment regulates conduct rather than thoughts,”
and “promotes evenhanded, uniform enforcement of the law.”148
The unanimous decision written by Justice Scalia for the
Whren Court constructed a smooth pathway for police officers
and prosecutors to disguise their pretextual and subjective
conceptions of Black men. Therefore, a police officer’s subjective
decision to target Black men does not affect the legality of the
investigation or litigation, so long as the officer had a sufficient
basis for the initial stop.149 Whren bars courts from considering
the ulterior mindset of the police officer.150 Thereby, the Whren
Court effectively proclaimed that despite the incorporation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
its intended protections of people of color, the Fourth
Amendment could not be used as a tool to combat racial
injustice.151 Thus, courts no longer ask whether police officers
conducted a traffic stop because they believed the occupants of
the car are involved in a crime—if a driver committed any traffic
violation, no matter how little, the inquiry stops there.152 Traffic
violations are omnipresent. As a result, an officer can create any

146. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
147. Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
148. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011) (first citing Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000); and then citing Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004)).
149. Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search
for an Exclusionary Rule under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1107, 1111 (2000).
150. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
151. See Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, supra note 49, at 250
(critiquing the Court’s unwillingness to provide a framework for the Fourth
Amendment to be used as a tool to ensure racial justice).
152. See David A. Harris, Essay, Driving While Black and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1997) (noting that a further inquiry would require
lower courts to engage in a post hoc Fourth Amendment judgment based on
the mindset of a reasonable officer).
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reason to support his agenda.153 Driving while Black thus
becomes a crime, and the simplest of traffic violations may be
exacerbated when committed by a Black male.154 Indeed, the
police officers do the work that the justice systems begs them to
do—Black males make up a large portion of those who are
prosecuted and incarcerated in the United States.155 Once again,
police use Black skin as a proxy, deeming the Black male to have
an aptitude for criminality and thus targeting all Blacks
because there are some criminals.156
Police exercise their discretion granted by the Court by
conflating criminality with Black people. Doing virtually
anything while being Black can and will be deemed suspicious
by police officers and community members—Black men and
women, as a societal and legal matter, are presently
dangerous.157 According to the ACLU of New York, in 2019,
there were 13,459 stops conducted in New York City.158 Black
people made up 59% of those stops, whereas white people made
up 9%; over 90 percent of the reported stops were of Black or
Latino people.159 Yet, according to the study, Black and Latino
153. See id. (“Fairly read, Whren says that any traffic violation can support
a stop, no matter what the real reason for it is; this makes any citizen fair
game for a stop, almost anytime, anywhere, virtually at the whim of the
police.”); Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, supra note 49, at 250
(“Therefore, the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to stop and arrest
every black man on the street or in their vehicle and refuse to stop any whites,
provided that the officer has probable cause of some violation, no matter how
minor.”).
154. See Harris, supra note 152, at 546 (discussing the prominence of
police officers stopping Black men just to see what they can find); see, also
Michael Fletcher, Driven to Extremes: Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police
Stops, WASH. POST., March 29, 1996, at A1 (discussing the “driving while
black” terminology).
155. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG
BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 3
(1995), https://perma.cc/GM67-SDQE (PDF) (providing that one in three of
Black men were under criminal justice supervision).
156. See Harris, supra note 152, at 572 (articulating that under such a
view, all Black people become criminals and suspects the moment they step
outside their homes).
157. See Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, supra note 49, at 254 (“The
Fourth Amendment constructs black as criminal by making it easier for the
police to investigate and arrest black people.”).
158. Stop and Frisk in the de Blasio Era, ACLU OF N.Y. (Mar. 14, 2019).
159. Id.
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males only account for five percent of New York City’s
population.160 Importantly, 66% of the stops of Black people led
to frisks, of which over 93% resulted in no weapon being
found.161 This data is unsurprising and points to the systemic
problem of officers engaging in racial profiling.162
Consider United States v. Robinson,163 a case arising out of
West Virginia, where gun laws are lenient.164 An unidentified
community member informed the Ranson, West Virginia Police
Department that he had “witnessed a [B]lack male in a bluish
greenish Toyota Camry load a firearm [and] conceal it in his
pocket” while in the parking lot of a 7-Eleven in a high crime
area.165 The community member also stated that the Camry was
being driven by a white woman, and had “just left” the parking
lot.166 An officer immediately left the station to respond to the
call, as, according to an officer’s testimony, “Anytime you
hear . . . 7-Eleven, your radar goes up a notch.”167 The
responding officer observed a blue-green Toyota Camry that

160. Id.
161. See id. (finding that Black and Latino people were more likely to be
frisked and were less likely to be found with a weapon).
162. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial Profiling:
Definitive Solutions to an Elusive Problem, 18 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC.
JUST. 25, 41 (2011) (discussing the burdens racial profiling places on
minorities).
163. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
164. See Strictest Gun Laws by State 2022, WORLD POPULATION REV.,
https://perma.cc/55JN-YST5 (giving West Virginia an “F” on its gun laws in
comparison to other states).
165. Robinson, 846 F.3d at 696 (modification in original). Once a
neighborhood is characterized as “high crime,” law enforcement agencies are
granted wider latitude in conducting searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)

But officers are not required to ignore the relevant
characteristics of a location in determining whether the
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant
further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously
noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime
area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a
Terry analysis.
166.
167.

Robinson, 846 F.3d. at 696.
Id.
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matched the description.168 As he tailed the car, he noticed that
the suspect was not wearing a seatbelt and subsequently
effected a traffic stop.169
The officer approached the vehicle with his weapon drawn
and proceeded to ask Robinson, who notably was the passenger
of the vehicle, for his identification card.170 Reckoning with the
fact that Robinson was a Black male, the officer immediately
regretted asking for Robinson’s identity, as he believed doing so
was “probably not a good idea” because “[t]his guy might have a
gun[,] [and] I’m asking him to get into his pocket to get his
I.D.”171 The captain of the police department arrived shortly
after this encounter and asked Robinson if he had any weapons
on him.172 Robinson did not verbally respond to the captain’s
question, and instead, in the words of the officer, “‘gave [him] a
weird look’ or, more specifically, an ‘“oh, crap” look[].’”173 The
captain deduced that the non-verbal conduct equaled
criminality.174 He then directed Robinson to put his hands on
top of the car, subsequently performed a frisk for weapons, and
then recovered a loaded gun from Robinson’s pants.175 The
captain stated that he recognized Robinson as a convicted felon
and arrested him.176 Robinson was charged with the illegal
possession of firearm by a felon.177
The majority opinion in Robinson correctly notes that guns
are inherently dangerous and pose a great safety risk to police
officers.178 But, in applying the framework set out in Terry, the
majority failed to address the real question, which is “whether a

168. Id. at 697.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (modifications in original).
172. Id.
173. Id. (second modification in original).
174. See id. (“[The captain] took the look to mean, ‘I don’t want to lie to
you, but I’m not going to tell you anything [either].’” (second modification in
original)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 698.
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person carrying a gun is a danger to the police or others.”179 The
conflation of whether the person carrying the gun is dangerous
and the gun being inherently dangerous is unsurprising.180 For
the majority opinion and for the police officers, the Black person
is inherently dangerous, and thus the police officers had
adequate reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Robinson.181
Consider the dissenting opinion in Robinson, written by
Judge Harris and joined by Chief Judge Gregory, Judge Motz,
and Senior Judge Davis.182 The dissenters created the pathway
that Chief Justice Warren failed to create in Terry.183 The
dissenters rightly observed that in states such as West Virginia
where laws on public possession of guns are lenient, someone
carrying a concealed firearm does not mean that they are
engaged in criminal activity.184 In other words, because someone
is armed does not mean that they are therefore dangerous.185 The
“armed and dangerous” standard should not be treated as a
unitary concept, for the logic of the Terry stop and frisk doctrine
is “premised on an independent role for dangerousness: Whether
a person in possession, of, say, a screwdriver is deemed ‘armed’
under Terry depends entirely on whether there is a separate
179. Id. at 708 (Harris, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)).
180. See Kevin Cokley, Opinion, Some Police Automatically Fear Black
Men. De-Escalation Training Won’t Solve That, USA TODAY (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://perma.cc/UQW9-C4SA (“Police violence against unarmed Black people
is as predictable as the rising and setting of the sun.”).
181. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 2017).
182. Id. at 707 (Harris, J., dissenting).
183. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (maintaining that if a police
officer believes that an individual is suspicious, the officer should have the
power to take necessary measures to determine whether the individual is
carrying a weapon).
184. See Robinson, 846 F.3d at 707 (Harris, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 539–40 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that in a
state that legalizes the public carry of firearms, public possession of a gun is
no longer “suspicious” and thus a Terry stop is prohibited); Northrup v. City of
Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131–33 (6th Cir. 2015) (same); United
States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 749–50, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the
search of a Black man’s backpack on suspicion that it contained a gun when
state law permits licensed concealed carry).
185. See Robinson, 846 F.3d at 709 (Harris J., dissenting) (“According to
the majority[,] if the police have reasonable suspicion that a suspect is ‘armed,’
then they necessarily have reasonable suspicion that he is ‘dangerous,’ as well,
justifying a frisk under Terry’s ‘armed and dangerous’ standard.”).
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reason to believe he or she is also ‘dangerous’ and thus might
use that screwdriver as a weapon.”186 Giving police officers a
wide margin of discretion to frisk individuals who are legally
armed means that they will likely target whom they deem to be
dangerous by virtue, thus posing a threat to the individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights.187 The dissenting opinion accurately
accentuates the problem for such a standard given the facts of
the case.188 It outlines the underlying problem of the facts that
the majority refused to acknowledge—Robinson was stopped so
that the police could investigate the tip they received about a
Black male in a high-crime neighborhood, not because he was
engaging in criminal activity that could lead someone to believe
that he was dangerous.189
Clearly, the problem lies in the standard by which the
officer is permitted to conduct a Terry stop and frisk: when the
officer reasonably suspects that the person they have stopped is
armed, then the officer’s conduct is “warranted in the belief that
his safety [is] in danger.”190 Chief Justice Warren failed to
realize that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence extends farther
than the exclusion of evidence. Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence extends to the everyday lives of Black men and
families living in inner cities of the United States, as well as
immigration arrests.191 The exclusionary rule does not
effectively do its job of protecting the constitutional rights and
autonomy of Black men.

186. Id. at 710–11.
187. See id. at 712 (“Allowing police officers making stops to frisk anyone
thought to be armed, in a state where the carrying of guns is widely permitted,
‘creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.’”
(quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009))).
188. Id. at 712.
189. See id. (highlighting that Robinson’s gun possession was
presumptively lawful, yet the police stopped him precisely because they had a
hunch that his possession was unlawful).
190.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger.”).
191. See HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10362, IMMIGRATION
ARRESTS IN THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 2–3 (2021)
(articulating that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures in immigration-related arrests and detentions).
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The well-known adage that “there must be in-groups whom
the law protects but does not bind, alongside out-groups whom
the law binds but does not protect,” unfortunately, has
manifested itself as reality for Black people.192 The following
subsections explore Supreme Court jurisprudence and racist
policing in greater detail.
A. Anything While Black Suggests Criminality
Black people are constantly subjected to instances of being
summarily judged whenever they step into the sphere of
traditional white spaces.193 Black people cannot enjoy
sightseeing without finding themselves in the lens of a sight.194
White people often call the police on Black people for
participating in normal, everyday activities. One explanation for
this could be that white people become confused when Black
people occupy white spaces that were traditionally off-limits to
people of color.195 Thus, the Black person who is engaging in
everyday tasks or utilizing traditional white spaces is presumed
to be out of place, and to only be there because of “crime,
violence, or impoverished opportunistic gain.”196
This preconceived notion and unconscious apprehension
has existed since slavery, and is exacerbated by Black people
taking up more space in privileged and powerful spaces.197 As
Elijah Anderson firmly articulates, “When black people do
appear in such places, white people subconsciously or explicitly
want to banish them to a place I have called the ‘iconic
ghetto’ . . . . A lag between the rapidity of black progress and
white acceptance of that progress is responsible for this
192. Fred Clark, Rights for Me but Not for Thee, PATHEOS: SLACKTIVIST
(Oct. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/73XF-TGKY.
193. See Lolita Buckner Inniss, Race, Space, and Surveillance: A Response
to #LivingWhileBlack: Blackness as Nuisance, 69 AM. U. L. REV. F. 213, 214
(emphasizing the “seemingly never-ending” occurrences of Black people being
subjected to vigilante and police detentions when charged with not complying
with “informal, unarticulated norms”).
194. Gunsight, BRITANNICA (1998), https://perma.cc/Q3TX-9TM7.
195. See Shawn E. Fields, Weaponized Racial Fear, 93 TUL. L. REV. 931,
948 (2019).
196. Id.
197. See id. (articulating the continual tension between Black people
taking up white spaces and white people being unnerved by it).
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impulse.”198 Black people are deemed criminals when relaxing
in a Starbucks, sleeping in a common area of a university, going
to the gym, eating in restaurants—the list goes on.199 Patrons
call the police because the Black person is taking up white space.
Such communications with police officers can be deemed
“racialized police calls” as they “function to expose innocent
Black individuals to increased interaction with law enforcement
and the associated emotional, psychological, and physiological
ill-effects.”200Americans who fear Black people because of their
preconceived notions rely on the police to ensure public spaces
remain segregated and that the color line is distinctively
drawn.201 But when courts analyze the “totality of the
circumstances” in a Fourth Amendment inquiry, the courts
neglects to factor in the implicit biases of police officers, and
therefore officers are permitted to impute suspicious
characteristics to actions that are normally not suspicious, until
they are combined with the fact that a Black person is engaging
in them.202

198. See Elijah Anderson, Black Americans Are Asserting Their Rights in
“White Spaces.” That’s When Whites Call 911, VOX (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://perma.cc/EUL4-4EU4 (explaining the sociology of living while Black).
199. Elizabeth Dias et al., Philadelphia Starbucks Arrests, Outrageous to
Some, Are Everyday Life for Others, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://perma.cc/E6AQ-KF5P; Brandon Griggs, A Black Yale Graduate
Student Took a Nap in Her Dorm’s Common Room. So A White Student Called
the Police, CNN (May 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/LKD5-EYSP; Rachel Siegel,
LA Fitness Employees Called 911 on Two Black Men They Said Didn’t Pay.
They Had., WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/U7J5-RZ2F; Breanna
Edwards, #EatingOutWhileBlack: Subway Employee Calls 911 on Black
Family Because She Thought They Would Rob Her, THE ROOT (July 5, 2018)
https://perma.cc/LM6V-RVXU.
200. See Chan Tov McNamarah, White Caller Crime: Racialized Police
Communication and Existing While Black, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 344
(2019).
201. See Fields, supra note 195, at 949 (arguing that racially fearful
Americans turn to the police to enforce an “invisible color line”).
202. See Aaron H. Mendelsohn, Fourth Amendment and Traffic Stops:
Bright-Line Rules in Conjunction with the Totality of the Circumstances Test,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 930, 946 (1998) (discussing the issues of the
totality of the circumstances analysis and how it gives police officers more
discretion).
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1.

The Hoodie, Racial Optics, and Its Association with
Urbanism and Reasonable Suspicion

Clothing can serve as an emotional medium that facilitates
individuality, autonomy, and association with racial groups.203
Moreover, clothing such as the hoodie may serve as “an alibi for
racial colonial optics as a surrogate for flesh.”204 The hoodie
alone, an inanimate object made up of sewn pieces of fabric, thus
furnishes the unbounded police officer with enough suspicion to
stop, frisk, detain, and kill the Black individual whose
sovereignty is undermined by means of that hoodie.205
Subjectively, the hoodie constitutes a knowledge of the
dangerousness of the Black individual, threatening the lives of
those who engage in personal autonomy and wear that specific
assortment of sewn pieces of fabric.206
The hoodie thus comes to life and becomes an animate
object that acts as a proxy to stop, frisk, detain, and even kill
Black individuals.207 Indeed, the hoodie has been stigmatized
and deemed a “staple of the criminal class,” making it a “proxy
for racial profiling or any other exercise of enmity.”208 But for
some who are isolated from the detrimental impact the hoodie
has had on the policing of Black individuals, the hoodie is
inanimate and is a “stupid, classic, innocuous, functional,
203. See George Lazaroiu, Communicative Functions of Smart Clothing, 4
CONTEMP. READINGS L. & SOC. JUST. 162, 165 (2012) (describing clothing as
“our second skin and an extension of our body” which facilitates social
interaction).
204. See Mimi Thi Nguyen, The Hoodie as Sign, Screen, Expectation, and
Force, 40 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 791, 792 (2015) (noting that
clothing may be used to legitimate forms of violence).
205. See id. (explaining that clothes can animate or overcome susceptible
bodies, “compelling others to act against them”).
206. See id. at 792–93 (“[F]iguration of the hoodie as an animate thing
demonstrates some of the operations of power that deem some bodies
criminally other—because they are black, and therefore threatening—and
available to state violence.”).
207. See NAACP, BORN SUSPECT: STOP-AND-FRISK ABUSES & THE
CONTINUED FIGHT TO END RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA 13–14 (2014),
https://perma.cc/T6SN-YXTK (PDF) (discussing a story about a biracial, Black
young man who was stopped and frisked because he looked “suspicious
wearing a hoodie over his head”).
208. Troy Patterson, The Politics of the Hoodie, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://perma.cc/M65R-XWGY (“The person itching to confirm a general bias
against hip-hop kids . . . imputes crooked character to the clothing itself.”).
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cuddly, universal” piece of clothing.209 Roxane Gay, for example,
believes that the hoodie is “besides the point.”210
Those who share a similar viewpoint to Gay’s are missing
an integral piece of the problem. The hoodie “constellates
historical-racial schema,” reinforcing the conflation between the
Black individual and the now-animate object.211 Hoodies should
not disproportionately insinuate criminality. “The Hoodie
Effect,” a social bias similar to the “turban effect” that was
widespread after 9/11, has thus emerged as a political and social
justice statement.212
The hoodie was not “besides the point” in the slaying of the
innocent 17-year-old, Trayvon Martin.213 George Zimmerman
murdered Trayvon Martin in “self-defense” on the basis that
Trayvon was a “suspicious” person wearing a “dark hoodie.”214
Imani Perry of Princeton University’s Center for African
American Studies precisely stated the problem:
Because of the pervasive and trenchant racial stereotypes
associated with black young people, especially males, their
styles are often singled out for criticism, as signs of
criminality and misdeeds . . . . But in truth this is simply
another form of stigmatization against the person
underneath the clothing, and only superficially has anything
to do with the clothing.215

Perhaps Trayvon Martin would still be alive today if he was
not wearing a hoodie—or, more importantly, if society had not

209. Nguyen, supra note 204, at 793–94 (critiquing the classification of the
hoodie as being an “immoderate jumble of qualities” and “ultimately inert
thing”).
210. Id. at 794 (citation omitted); see id. (critiquing Gay’s analogy of the
hoodie as similar to what a woman was wearing when she was raped).
211. Id.
212. See Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich, The ‘Hoodie Effect’: George,
Trayvon, and How It Might Have Happened, 24 JURY EXPERT 17, 22 (2012)
(“The hoodie has become a sociopolitical statement seen in Congress, at rallies
protesting Trayvon Martin’s death, among professional athletes, and in
churches.”).
213. See Emanuella Grinberg, Hoodie’s Evolution from Fashion Mainstay
to Symbol of Injustice, CNN, https://perma.cc/S28J-JS5F (last updated Mar.
27, 2012, 3:10 PM) (articulating the social stigma carried with the hoodie).
214. Id.
215. Id.
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stigmatized the hoodie and associated it with the criminality of
Black men and urbanism.
2.

Strange Fruit in Our Neighborhood216

The death of Ahmaud Arbery is a modern-day lynching, and
his Blackness was deemed a property tort.217 Ahmaud Arbery, a
twenty-five-year-old Black man, went jogging in a suburban
neighborhood in Georgia on a Sunday afternoon.218 On that
afternoon, three armed white men, Gregory McMichael, Travis
McMichael, and William Bryan, saw Arbery in the neighborhood
and hunted him down as if he were prey.219 The three white men
were entrusted by the Glynn County Police Department to
respond to trespasses in the area, and the police department
armed them with a revolver and a 12-gauge shotgun “to stand
in as law enforcement and to respond to recent neighborhood
trespasses ‘day or night.’”220 The homeowner who Arbery was
accused of stealing from stated that he did not believe that
Arbery stole anything from his property, nor did he file any prior
police reports.221 Predictably, the white killers who racially

216. See Karen Juanita Carrillo, How Billie Holiday’s ‘Strange Fruit’
Confronted an Ugly Era of Lynchings, HISTORY (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://perma.cc/8U6V-K25K (discussing the meaning behind the lyrics of
“Strange Fruit” and how it paints a picture of the American South, where
“political and psychological terror” continues to reign over African American
communities).
217. See Bill Hutchinson, Ahmaud Arbery Murder Case May Evoke
Georgia’s History on Race: Experts, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2021),
https://perma.cc/2WS4-YWWT (quoting the statement of Benjamin Crump
that the killing of Arbery was a “modern day lynching”); Taja-Nia Y.
Henderson & Jamila Jefferson-Jones, #LivingWhileBlack: Blackness as
Nuisance, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 863, 870 (2020) (describing the core principles of
property law and how those principles are used to police Black people).
218. Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting Death of
Ahmaud Arbery, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/L9EW-WRZG
(last updated Aug. 8, 2022).
219. See Aaron Keller, Ahmaud Arbery’s Family Files Federal Civil Rights
Lawsuit Exactly One Year After He Was Shot and Killed, L. & CRIME (Feb. 23,
2021), https://perma.cc/8DX8-9LQ4 (recounting the events that led to Arbery’s
murder).
220. Id.
221. Tony Thomas, Homeowner Doesn’t Believe Ahmaud Arbery Stole
Anything Before Shooting, WSB-TV ATL. (May 13, 2020, 6:44 AM),
https://perma.cc/AQ6M-AP25.
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profiled Arbery had a “gut feeling” that he was responsible for
prior thefts throughout the neighborhood, based on the fact that
he was a Black man jogging in a white neighborhood.222
Running has been one of the most favored American
pastimes since the late 1960s.223 On its face, it is one of the most
egalitarian exercises one could engage in.224 But, as in Ahmaud
Arbery’s case, Black runners are not guaranteed the same
protections as their white counterparts.225 Black people are seen
as the exact opposite of the ideal, “yuppie” white jogger.226 Black
people, of course, are thus subject to increased surveillance and
heightened suspicion—jogging while Black denotes criminality,
and thus the Black jogger is subject to a stop and frisk.227
Generations of white people have expected the
“ghettoization” of Black men, given their portrayal in
entertainment outlets.228 Rapper J. Cole articulated this notion
in an assemblage of rhymes in his song “Neighbors.”229 He
explicitly discusses that existing as a Black man gives rise to
criminality and suspicion, particularly in white suburban
neighborhoods. J. Cole states:
I can’t sleep ‘cause I’m paranoid
Black in a white man territory
Cops bust in with the army guns
No evidence of the harm we done230

222. Keller, supra note 219.
223. See Natalia Mehlman Petrzela, Jogging Has Always Excluded Black
People, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/F2M4-7B5M (outlining the
historical discrimination of leisure jogging).
224. Id.
225. See id. (emphasizing that the “new national pastime” did not
universally deliver its promises).
226. See id. (“By the 1980s, jogging had become known as a ‘yuppie’
affectation, like eating croissants, owning a fancy juicer, and working on Wall
Street.”).
227. See id. (arguing that jogging has never been an “equal-opportunity
endeavor”); see also Jacey Fortin, On Ahmaud Arbery’s Birthday, Thousands
Say #IRunWithMaud, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/N57R-PDGL
(providing an anecdote of a Black runner who runs with identification in her
pocket in case she is ever stopped, even in her own neighborhood).
228. See Fields, supra note 201, at 947 (discussing “Iconic Ghettos” and
“White Spaces”).
229. J. COLE, Neighbors, on 4 YOUR EYEZ ONLY (Dreamville Records 2016).
230. Id.
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As J. Cole articulates, Black men, such as Arbery, are
perceived as a threat despite a lack of any incriminating
evidence.231 Arbery’s presence was viewed as a criminal threat
and the white men argued that if Arbery would have complied
once they stopped him, he would still be alive.232 The three
killers, however, stopped and killed Arbery based on their
“reasonable” suspicion that he was a criminal threat, or, in other
words, armed and dangerous.233 Through the history of the
White Fourth Amendment, such actions seemed to be
justified.234
3.

Designer Shoes Serve as a Basis for Reasonable Suspicion

Racial profiling of Black men does not exist solely in the
South. Salehe Bembury, a Black Versace executive, was stopped
and searched by a Beverly Hills police officer after jaywalking.235
The police officer searched Bembury’s Versace store bag, which
contained a pair of shoes from the store, and proceeded to ask
Bembury why he was crossing the road.236 The police officer then
asked Bembury for his identification and requested he put his
arms behind his back during the search.237 Given that
231. See Fausset, supra note 218 (discussing the prosecutor’s arguments
that Arbery posed no imminent threat to the three men and that they had no
reason to believe he had committed a crime, giving them no legal right to chase
him through the suburban neighborhood).
232. See Cat Brooks, Opinion, Ahmaud Arbery’s Murderers Would be Free
if it Wasn’t for Black Lives Matter Protests, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 24, 2021),
https://perma.cc/TCY4-7DUR (last updated Nov. 27, 2021 11:27 PM)
(rationalizing that today, when Black people do not comply with the “whims”
of white people, there are “severe physical assaults, threats of or actual calls
to the police, and . . . murder”).
233. See Keller, supra note 219 (noting that the defendants had a “gut
feeling” that Ahmaud was responsible for prior thefts); see also Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (noting that if a police officer believes that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual, he need not have probable cause to
arrest the individual for a crime in order to perform a search for weapons).
234. See Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, supra note 49, at 253
(reasoning that the Fourth Amendment creates criminals and helps to define
Blacks by constructing Blacks as criminal, making it easier for the police to
arrest and investigate Black people).
235. Priya Elan, Versace Executive Accuses Los Angeles Police of Racial
Profiling, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/4GKV-837E.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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jaywalking is illegal in Beverly Hills, the police officers were
within their discretion to stop him.238 Yet, the police officers had
little reason to be suspicious that Bembury was engaging in any
illegal activity or that he was a threat to the public and thus had
no grounds to search him.239 In the video that Bembury posted
on his Instagram while being searched, the police officer alleged
that Bembury was “making a completely different narrative”
when Bembury accused the police officer of searching him
because he was Black and carrying a designer bag.240 The police
department released bodycam footage of the incident and cited
heavy traffic in the area for their actions.241 It is evident,
however, that this is not an explanation for why Bembury was
frisked—instead, Bembury’s Black skin insinuated criminality.
4.

The KKK Uniform Remains Crimeless While the Black
Man Wearing a Hoodie Is an Authorized Target

Young white men have the privilege to engage in personal
autonomy without fearing the repercussions of police violence.
They have the privilege to embrace their identity by adopting
hillbilly attire, skinhead attire, frat-boy attire—you name it.242
This is clearly not the case for Black men.243 For some Black
individuals, seeing a white man with a shaved head and a
Confederate flag hanging from his pickup truck can result in a
degree of apprehension.244 Yet, for police officers, white men
engaging in such dress or expression means that they are
embracing their culture, or, exercising their First Amendment
right to freedom of expression.245 As Robin Givhan accurately
points out, the difference lies in the fact that Black individuals
238. Tod Perry, Beverly Hills Police Frisked Versace Executive Salehe
Bembury for Holding One of His Company’s Own Bags, UPWORTHY (Oct. 5,
2020), https://perma.cc/3XDQ-2CHG.
239. Id.
240. Elan, supra note 235.
241. Perry, supra note 238.
242. See Robin Givhan, Trayvon, Hoodies and America’s Fears, DAILY
BEAST (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:39 PM), https://perma.cc/3P4R-8NJP (last updated
Jul. 13, 2017, 1:37 PM) (emphasizing that white men have the privilege to
“take solace in the protective shells of stereotypes”).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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have been systemically dehumanized and prejudiced in the ways
in which they can freely express themselves through dress.246
The founder of Facebook and entrepreneur Mark
Zuckerberg, for example, has embraced the hoodie so he can
“make as few decisions as possible about anything except how to
best serve [the] community.”247 According to style gurus,
Zuckerberg wore the hoodie for a meeting on Wall Street to say,
“The West Coast techies truly fuel this economy, and you will
now live by our rules (and our dress codes).”248 It has been noted
that “[t]he very potency of dress as a form of communication,
resistance, and survival for marginalized groups has made it a
compelling tool for maintaining social hierarchy throughout
history.”249 Yet Black individuals such as Trayvon Martin do not
get the privilege to decide which message they want to send—
their message has been made for them at through the hands of
systemic racism.250 Jason J. Campbell properly scrutinized the
role racism plays in the hoodie: “African American males cannot
conduct themselves in the same way that young white males

246. See Givhan, supra note 242. (“There is no legacy of racism and
systemic dehumanization that holds white men hostage to their body
language, their patois, and their wardrobes. There is no tradition of corrupt
institutional fear among police officers and sheriffs whose prejudices feed the
communities that turn to them for protection.”).
247. Jake Woolf, Mark Zuckerberg Humblebragged About Only Owning
Gray Tees and Hoodies, GQ (Jan. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/CJ7F-D3VU.
248. Eduardo Munoz, How a Hoodie Sent a Signal to the Suits, NBC NEWS
(May 11, 2012), https://perma.cc/49D2-HWJ2.
249. Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and Gender: Prison Regulation of
Social Hierarchy through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 874 (2012).
250. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, Letter to My Son, THE ATL., (July 4, 2015)
https://perma.cc/DMF8-YUEZ

Always remember that Trayvon Martin was a boy, that
Tamir Rice was a particular boy, that Jordan Davis was
a boy, like you. When you hear these names think of all
the wealth poured into them. Think of . . . all the shared
knowledge and capacity of a black family injected into
that vessel of flesh and bone. And think of how that
vessel was taken, shattered on the concrete, and all its
holy contents, all that had gone into each of them, was
sent flowing back down to the earth.
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can.”251 Similarly, Michael Skolnik stated that he, as a white
male, would never have the same fate as Trayvon Martin.252
Skolnik acknowledged that wearing a black hoodie would never
make him suspicious or, in other words, presently dangerous.253
Rhode Island State Senator Cynthia Mendes referred to dress
codes as “colonization language,” “remind[ing] everyone who is
in power. It has always started with what you tell them to do
with their bodies.”254
Courts have gone so far to say that the white robes, masks,
and hoods worn by the members of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK)
were “expressive in the way that wearing a uniform is
expressive, identifying the wearer with other wearers of the
same uniform, and with the ideology or purpose of the group.”255
The distinctive KKK white uniform, which includes KKK
insignia, was first used to create a ghost-like appearance to
assist members in playing pranks.256 These so-called pranks
transformed into nocturnal visits to the dwellings of Blacks,
harassing and intimidating them.257 And although the KKK
uniforms were created for the sole purpose of terrorizing Black

251. James Eng, Trayvon Martin Case: Is Young, Black and Wearing a
Hoodie a Recipe for Disaster?, NBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2012),
https://perma.cc/9XV7-EMKT.
252. Id.
253. See id.

Even if I have a black hoodie, a pair of jeans and white
sneakers on . . . in fact, that is what I wore
yesterday . . . I still will never look suspicious. No
matter how much the hoodie covers my face or how
baggy my jeans are, I will never look out of place to
you. . . . I will never look suspicious to you, because of
one thing and one thing only. The color of my skin.
254. Philip Marcelo, Are Dress Codes Racist and Sexist? Legislators are
Increasingly Pushing Back on Them as More Women and People of Color Get
Elected, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/ZB4N-9AJF.
255. Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
206 (2004); see id. (finding that “[t]he mask that the members of the American
Knights seek to wear in public demonstrations does not convey a message
independently of the robe and hood”).
256. WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE KU KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA
33 (1987).
257. Id. at 36–37.
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individuals and their allies, the prominent KKK mask was not
considered to convey a message by itself.258
The Court’s justification gives more power to white
supremacist policing and KKK in the Police Department.259 Law
enforcement has acknowledged the killings of Black people, yet
law enforcement continually allows the killing of Blacks to occur
without officers being prosecuted.260 Thus, law enforcement
entities are aware of the blatant, conscious, racism that plague
our criminal justice system, as the white supremacists within
the police departments are those who deliberately go into Black
communities to do harm.261 White supremacists permeate the
police force from the top down and encourage new officers to act
in a hostile manner towards Black people, despite not having
reasonable suspicion or a reason to do so. For example, police
officer Tod Shaw of Louisville, Kentucky told a police recruit
that it was okay to shoot Black kids if they were caught smoking
marijuana: “If black, shoot them.”262
Such bigoted ideals infiltrate the police force and
alarmingly—but unsurprisingly— disproportionately impact
Black people, as Black people do not have the law as a shield
from hatred and violence.263 As a result, a study has found that

258. See Kerik, 365 F.3d at 206 (concluding that the masks add “no
expressive force to the message portrayed” by the entire KKK outfit).
259. See Vida B. Johnson, KKK in the PD: White Supremacist Police and
What to Do About It, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 205, 214 (2019) (noting that
since 2006, the FBI has been on notice about white supremacist groups
infiltrating police departments); see also Kenya Downs, FBI Warned of White
Supremacists in Law Enforcement 10 Years Ago. Has Anything Changed?, PBS
NEWS HOUR (Oct. 21, 2016, 4:10 PM), https://perma.cc/6HCN-38TC (“In the
2006 bulletin, the FBI detailed the threat of white nationalists and skinheads
infiltrating police in order to disrupt investigations against fellow members
and recruit other supremacists.”); Florida Town Stunned by News of Police
Department’s KKK Ties, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 21, 2014),
https://perma.cc/2DAK-XBTL.
260. See Madison Parks, Police Shootings: Trials, Convictions Are Rare for
Officers, CNN, https://perma.cc/2VYE-3TUE (last updated Oct. 3, 2018, 4:41
PM) (providing data on officer convictions for murders or manslaughter
charges for on-duty shootings).
261. Johnson, supra note 259, at 217.
262. Ralph Ellis, Former Kentucky Police Official Allegedly Sent Racist
Messages to Recruit, CNN (Jan. 22, 2018, 10:25 PM), https://perma.cc/V62GWK8L.
263. Johnson, supra note 259, at 227.
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Black victims of police killings are overrepresented.264 Yet,
according to the study, white victims were more likely to be
armed and posed a greater threat to the safety of police
officers.265 But that does not matter. According to such bigoted
ideals, Black skin is harmful in and of itself, approximating
someone who is armed and presently dangerous.
B. The Consequences of Blackness Serving as a Basis for
Reasonable Suspicion
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be separated
from the individual and collective costs it has had on Black
communities.266 This Subpart specifically discusses (1) the
psychological impact, (2) residential segregation, and (3) mass
incarceration.
1.

The Psychological Impact

As Chief Justice Warren outlined in Terry, the search of an
individual’s body is a “serious intrusion of the sanctity of the
person.”267 The Chief Justice correctly noted that such an
intrusion of one’s person “may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment.”268 Police officers disrespect the autonomy
and dignity of the Black individual, which is a felonizing process
that weighs heavily on the mental health and psyche of the
Black individual.269 Black individuals tend to experience an
increase in stress and anxiety when seeing and interacting with

264. See Reed T. DeAngelis, Systemic Racism in Police Killings: New
Evidence from the Mapping Police Violence Database, 2013–2021, RACE &
JUST.: ONLINEFIRST, Oct. 19, 2021, at 1, 2.
265. Id. at 8.
266. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating
Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2429
(2017) (articulating that the costs of stop and frisks “cannot be properly
understood . . . once . . . detached from the historical origins of concentrated
poverty”).
267. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968).
268. Id. at 17.
269. See Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and
Mental Health, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 679 (2016).
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the police.270 As Camille Nelson articulates, “[R]acial
discrimination is abusive. Its dire consequences are debilitating,
destructive, and disabling.”271 Fear of racism is enough to
trigger the body’s stress-responses.272 Unsurprisingly, Black
individuals are targeted more than white individuals.273 When
there is a disparity as great as social injustice which affects the
health and wellbeing of communities, the associated costs and
risks become intergenerational and are hard to deconstruct.274
2.

Residential Segregation

Segregated housing is the most visible indication of deeply
rooted racism in the United States.275 Residential segregation
did not happen overnight. In the early 1900s, the African
American population began to grow, which alarmed white
people and resulted in community riots.276 From 1910 to 1920,
white people began to seek a residential apartheid and started
using institutionalized methods of keeping Black people out of
their neighborhoods.277 Racially discriminatory covenants were
implemented, and neighborhood associations took great effort to
prevent Black people from living and taking up space in white
communities.278
270. See Joscha Legewie & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Aggressive Policing and the
Educational Performance of Minority Youth, 84 AM. SOCIO. REV. 220, 224
(2019).
271. Nelson, supra note 269, at 681.
272. See Jason Silverstein, How Racism Is Bad for Our Bodies, THE ATL.,
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/PU2K-4JJJ.
273. See id. (“In 70 of 76 precincts, greater than 50 percent of stops
targeted blacks and Latinos.”).
274. See id. (noting that social injustice is passed down through
generations).
275. See William M. Wiecek, The United States Supreme Court and
Residential Segregation: “Slavery Unwilling to Die”, 3 J.L. PROP. & SOC’Y 35,
36 (2017) (“Segregated housing provides the matrix for all other social ills
afflicting African-Americans in the United States, and is the principal cause
of racial inequality in the United States today.”).
276. See Natasha M. Trifun, Residential Segregation After the Fair
Housing Act, 36 HUM. RTS. 14, 15 (2009).
277. See id.
278. See id. (“These associations used various methods to achieve their
goal, such as lobbying city councils for zoning restrictions, but their most
important function was implementing racially restrictive covenants to prevent
property owners from transferring their property to African Americans.”); see
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In 1910, Baltimore adopted a racial segregation ordinance
prohibiting Black people from living in a house on the same
block of white families.279 Although there was a Supreme Court
decision which held that racially restrictive covenants were
unconstitutional,280 states continued to enforce them.281
Black people who live in public housing have limited Fourth
Amendment guarantees.282 For example, in the late 1980s, the
Chicago Housing Authority began conducting surprise raids at
public housing developments with the goal of scouring buildings
for drugs and weapons.283 In one raid, around 450 apartments
were searched, and within minutes, every Black person who
walked through the area was stopped and searched.284
Unsurprisingly, a Black woman who was carrying a bag filled
with laundry was stopped and patted down by guards who
emptied her bag of laundry onto the ground, finding no
contraband.285 This is acceptable under the Fourth Amendment,
also Thompson v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 348 F.Supp.2d 398, 452 (D. Md.
2005) (holding that the defendants did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus did not violate Title VI).
279. Wiecek, supra note 275, at 45.
280. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (“We think this
attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a person of
color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and in direct
violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .”). But see Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330–31 (1926)
(finding that a racially restrictive covenant was not a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
281. See Permalee v. Morris, 188 N.W. 330, 330 (Mich. 1922) (noting that
the Fourteenth Amendment “could not have been intended to abolish the
distinction based upon color” and thus upholding the covenant (quoting Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896)).
282. See Charles Hellman, Note, Secure in Their Houses? Fourth
Amendment Rights at Public Housing Projects, 40 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 189, 196
(1995) (discussing “Operation Clean Sweep,” implemented by the Chicago
Housing Authority to police public housing projects and supported by
President George H.W. Bush). See generally, e.g., Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The
Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young + Black + Male = Probable
Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621 (1993); David A. Harris, Factors for
Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69
IND. L.J. 659 (1994).
283. Sharman Stein & William Recktenwald, 65 Seized in Sweep at CHA
Homes, CHICAGO TRIB. (Apr. 7, 1992, 12:00 AM), https://perma.cc/6DLLESWU.
284. Id.
285. Id.

214

80 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 171 (2022)

though, as public housing residents have weak and limited
Fourth Amendment protections, which therefore results in
criminalization of low-income communities.286
The scale of stop and frisks that occur in Black
neighborhoods leave their occupants feeling that “they are living
under siege.”287 Black people who live in highly patrolled
neighborhoods are treated as a “permanent under-caste,” as
they cannot enjoy a leisurely walk, a neighborhood gathering, or
a breath of fresh air without being subject to police
harassment.288 A hostile police presence is “so frequent” that it
is expected.289 Interviewees from a study conducted by the
Center for Constitutional Rights stated, “I feel like we’re not in
a free country when you can’t walk down the street. You got to
be questioned about where you’re going and what you’re doing,”
and “I have always felt the need to carry my ID because if I
didn’t carry my ID in my own neighborhood, I would basically
be putting myself [at risk] of being picked up and accused of
doing sex work.”290 Other interviewees expressed that they felt
as if they were trapped inside their apartments because leaving
their apartments meant that they would be subject to police
harassment.291 The aggressive policing of Black neighborhoods
is simply militaristic and only serves the purpose of stopping
and frisking innocent Black people, keeping them in the
unyielding chokehold.292
Racial separateness allows relationships to be formed
around racial lines. When Black people cross those racial lines
and take up white space, police become suspicious that the Black
person is committing a crime and, under our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the police officer has the power to
286. See Sarah Miller, The Criminalization of Public Housing Residents,
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y ONLINE (Mar. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/4BSC72Z9 (discussing Fourth Amendment safeguards for public housing residents).
287. CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 17 (2012),
https://perma.cc/Q7CN-32DN (PDF).
288. See id. at 17–18 (discussing the stories of Black people who are
consistently harassed by police in their neighborhoods).
289. See id. at 17 (“We expect them to jump out of a car. We expect them
to just come out the staircase and scare the hell out of you. We expect it.”).
290. Id. at 17–18.
291. Id.
292. See id. at 19 (discussing a conversation in which an interviewee stated
that the NYPD is seen as “occupying army”).
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conduct a stop based on that suspicion.293 Terry gives
authorization to police officers to stop based on their reasonable
suspicion, despite not having an articulable reason for doing
so.294
In Shelley v. Kraemer,295 the Supreme Court held that
neither federal or state courts could enforce racist covenants to
evict Black homeowners.296 The defendants in Shelley argued
that the racially-restrictive property covenant was neutral and,
since state courts were prepared to enforce covenants restricting
white people from the ownership of property covered by
particular agreements, “enforcement of covenants excluding
colored persons may not be deemed a denial of equal protection
of the laws to the colored persons who are thereby affected.”297
Chief Justice Vinson quickly dismissed that argument by
critiquing the defendants’ failure to provide any case in which
the a court had been asked to “enforce a covenant excluding
members of the white majority from ownership” of property.298
The Court ultimately expanded the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment.299 The Supreme Court declared that
the concern of the Fourteenth Amendment was to establish
equality of basic civil rights and to preserve those rights from
racial discriminatory action on behalf of the states.300 In reading
Shelley, one might conclude that there are no longer racially
divided neighborhoods. But the effect of Shelley only did so
much, as white people found other means to push Black people
out of their neighborhoods.301
293. See I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L.
L. REV. 43, 61 (2009) (discussing the deference given to police officers through
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
294. Id. at 63; see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000) (“In
allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent
people.”).
295. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
296. Id. at 23.
297. Id. at 21–22.
298. Id. at 22.
299. Id. at 22–23.
300. Id. at 23.
301. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between
Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and
Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 715 (1993) (discussing gentrification
of neighborhoods).
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3.

Mass Incarceration and Modern Slavery

Mass incarceration and racist policing are undoubtedly
intertwined. Antiblack disciplinary traditions have created and
perpetuated the racist carceral system, as the “Thirteenth
Amendment permits slavery of incarcerated persons and in
turn, state and federal prisons force prisoners into the modern
labor conditions of slavery.”302 Furthermore what defines the
tradition of the racist carceral system is the police officer’s
boundless ability to incapacitate Black individuals and engage
in “habitual surveillance.”303 Police officers have characterized
Black people as “internal enemies” and “volatile threats” to
established social order.304 Since the beginning of the
criminalization and incarceration of Black people and their
descendants, police officers have utilized practices that target
Black people, enhancing and furthering spatial and social
control.305
As discussed earlier, instead of placing a limit or providing
a racially-conscious framework to policing, the Supreme Court
has determined that the breadth and scope of Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures depends on reasonableness
in the eyes of police officers.306 The Supreme Court has gone so
far as to grant police officers “nearly unlimited arrest power.”307
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,308 the Court concluded that an
officer’s authority to make an arrest of a woman without a

302. Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery,
Capitalism, and Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 952 (2019).
303. See Elizabeth Hinton & DeAnza Cook, The Mass Criminalization of
Black Americans: A Historic Overview, 4 ANN. REV. OF CRIMINOLOGY 261, 263
(2021) (“Policing and criminalization practices have worked in tandem
historically to monitor and contain people of color and low-income groups
within and beyond US borders.”).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Tahir Duckett, The Hidden Constitutional Costs of the Carceral
System, THE ATL. (June 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/4TRF-2SWH (“[I]n
criminal law, courts have repeatedly narrow the scope of the Constitution’s
protections over the past 50 years—the time period coinciding with the rise of
mass incarceration—without requiring the government to prove that these
limitations are justified.”).
307. Id.
308. 532 U.S. 318 (2000).
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warrant for a misdemeanor was consistent with common law.309
In setting this precedent, the Court once again limited
constitutional guarantees while giving police officers an
abundance of latitude and self-governance. As Tahir Duckett
forcefully states, “Courts must stop permitting municipalities to
hide the costs of policing by levying them upon black
communities instead of upon police departments and city
budgets.”310 Courts continually place the burden on Black backs,
showing deference to budgets and a complete disregard to Black
life and autonomy. Police reform can only do so much when the
courts are reinforcing racist policing.311 It starts with the courts
and the legislature to acknowledge the issues and strip the
capricious, racially-motivated limitations from constitutional
guarantees.312
Mass incarceration is part of a societal system and
framework built on the backs of Black men from which they
cannot escape.313 Mass incarceration furthers Black male
oppression through aggressive and groundless policing.
Furthermore, it places Black males in what Paul Butler calls the
chokehold.314 Butler efficaciously argues that law enforcement
entities use their discretion as officers to police Black men,
which contributes to the amount of Black men in prison and,
thus, mass incarceration.315 In doing so, Butler articulates that
the Chokehold characterizes every Black man, no matter his
309. See id. at 354 (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence,
he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”).
310. Duckett, supra note 306.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See Goodwin, supra note 302, at 954 (discussing the nation’s reliance
on racist policing and the carceral system as a means to maintain racial and
social hierarchies).
314. See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN AND WOMEN IN
AMERICA 12 (2017) [hereinafter BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD] (describing the
Chokehold and how it continually polices Black people); see also City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (vividly
describing a police chokehold). Justice Thurgood Marshall boldly criticized the
Los Angeles chokehold policy. Id. He provided imagery of the brutal chokehold:
“His face turns blue and he is deprived of oxygen, he goes into spasmodic
convulsions, his eyes roll back, his body wriggles, his feet kick up and down,
and his arms move about wildly.” Id. at 118.
315. BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD, supra note 314.
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wealth or social status, as a “thug.”316 Butler then argues that
the policing of Black men in the framework of the chokehold is
a device which is deeply rooted in slavery and the continuance
of Black men serving about subordinates subordinate.317
As Michele Goodwin articulates, mass incarceration and
the American prison system is the “market in policed bodies.”318
Incarceration successfully masks slavery and it does so
cunningly through the unrelenting vestiges of racial bigotry,
finely tuned fear, and stereotypes. Viewed in this light,
prison is not about disproportionate and racialized policing
and the exploitation of labor, but rather community safety.
Despite rates of criminality mapping similarly between
Blacks, Whites, and Latinos, most white Americans presume
that Blacks are more dangerous, prone to criminality, and
likely to commit more crimes.319

In sum, mass incarceration in the United States is deeply
racialized, resembling Antebellum slavery and its control of
Black bodies.320
III. THE BLACK FOURTH AMENDMENT
Racial fear and stereotyping are entwined and embedded in
the American social sphere—individual actors, by themselves,
cannot fix the issue of epidemic racial fear, as racism is so deeply
ingrained in the American unconscious mind and cherished
concepts.321 But the courts, Congress, and the American people
can transform and reconstruct the Fourth Amendment and its
hazy, inherently racist jurisprudence instead of reinforcing the
emphasis it places on the objective standard in the

316. Id. at 5.
317. Id. at 6.
318. Goodwin, supra note 302, at 957.
319. Id. at 957–58.
320. Id. at 960.
321. See Fields, supra note 195, at 949 (claiming that racist tropes are so
ingrained that no amount of bias awareness training will rid the epidemic of
racial fear); see also Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes
and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 111 (2002)
(maintaining that attitudes and stereotypes are unconscious and outside the
ability to exert full conscious control).
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reasonableness analyses of the Fourth Amendment.322 The
Fourth Amendment should be construed as the Black Fourth
Amendment vis-á-vis the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses. The Black Fourth
Amendment will guarantee Black people the same rights and
protections that white people are given by doing what the Equal
Protection Clause intended it to do: to prevent the states from
denying any person in their jurisdictions “equal protections of
the laws.”323
As Paul Butler notes, the problem is that “the system is
working the way it is supposed to.”324 Inhumane prisons, police
brutality, and criminal processes were developed for Black
people.325 The Supreme Court is well aware that in expanding
police powers, Black men will suffer the consequences. But the
Court is intentional in the precedent it sets, despite its failure
to mention race in its decisions that clearly have an impact on
people of color.326

322. See generally Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991); Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). States are taking initiative by including race
and ethnicity in Fourth Amendment analyses. The Supreme Court of
Washington state unanimously held that race must be considered when
determining the legality of police stops and seizures. State v. Sum, 511 P.3d
92 (Wash. 2022). The Washington Supreme Court based its decision on the fact
that a provision in the Washington Constitution which is analogous to the U.S.
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. Article 1, § 7 of the Washington
Constitution is more stringent than the Fourth Amendment and provides
greater protections by using the “objective observer” test, where the objective
observer is “aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in
addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in disproportionate police
contacts, investigative seizures, and uses of force against Black, Indigenous,
and other People of Color (BIPOC) in Washington.” Id. at 97.
323. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . .”); see also Dennis
Parker, The 14th Amendment Was Intended to Achieve Racial Justice—And
We Must Keep It That Way, ACLU (July 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/NU5N-Y9C9
(“The 14th Amendment was enacted with the intent to support a series of
race-conscious programs that were created at the time to aid Blacks newly
emancipated by the 13th Amendment.”).
324. Paul Butler, Equal Protection and White Supremacy, 112 NW. U. L.
REV. 1457, 1458 (2018).
325. See BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD, supra note 314.
326. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 (2001) (discussing
how petitioner was erroneously jailed for not wearing a seatbelt, which was
upheld by the Court, and thus expanding police power).
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As discussed in Part II, “the central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race.”327 Congress had a clear understanding that segregation
and other issues were inconsistent with equality in American
society.328 For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson,329 the Supreme
Court dismissed and refused to acknowledge its power in
combating societal racism by abandoning the original idea of the
Equal Protection Clause.330 The Supreme Court, however,
discussed the cornerstone for equal protection rights for
individuals in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.331 In Yick Wo, the Court
pronounced:
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his
life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself.332

Yet, even when the Supreme Court acknowledges the
significance of the incorporation of the Equal Protection Clause,
it still fails to set forth any practical method to tackle the racial
implications in the laws of the United States. For example, in
Shelley, Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the majority, directly
addressed the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause.333 The Chief
Justice discussed the historical context of the Fourteenth
Amendment, stating that “[w]hatever else the framers sought to
achieve . . . the matter of primary concern was the
establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and
political rights and the preservation of those rights from
327. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see also Alexis Hoag,
An Unbroken Thread: African American Exclusion from Jury Service, Past and
Present, 81 LA. L. REV. 55, 61 (2020) (noting that prior to drafting the
Fourteenth Amendment, a committee heard testimony from businessmen who
expressed that Black people felt as if they did not have redress in the courts).
328. See R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. 445, 453 (1873) (discussing Congress’
intentions in passing legislation in the belief that discrimination was unjust).
329. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
330. See id. at 544 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
passed to abolish distinctions based on color).
331. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
332. Id. at 370.
333. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
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discriminatory action on the part of the States based on
considerations of race or color.”334 Yet, this decision was
superfluous and ineffective, as white regimes continually
enforce tools to prevent Black people from existing in
traditionally white spaces.
In Whren, the Supreme Court created space to challenge the
invidious intent and motives of law enforcement—but only
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Fourth
Amendment.335 While it narrowed claims that can be brought
under the Fourth Amendment, the Court provided latitude for
the Equal Protection Clause to work as it was intended to: “the
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”336
However, proving a race-based violation of one’s constitutional
rights is overwhelmingly challenging, despite there not being “a
shortage of anecdotal evidence regarding the use of race” when
police conduct stops.337 A claimant must overcome an
evidentiary hurdle when bringing a claim of race-based violation
of the Equal Protection Clause by proving that “the federal
prosecutorial policy ‘had a discriminatory effect and that it was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose’” and “that similarly
situated individuals of a difference race were not prosecuted.”338
This standard required by the Court is nearly impossible to
meet, and “the net result of the Court’s holding in Whren is that
a traffic stop later deemed unconstitutional under the Equal

334. Id.
335. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (providing the
constitutional basis to bring claims alleging racially-influenced traffic stops).
336. Id.
337. Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some
Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
559, 591 n.42 (1998); see Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1977) (noting that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s fate was inauspicious as its existence was
suppressed by the judiciary, despite the Framers’ intent).
338. U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 506 (1962)); see Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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Protection Clause can still be deemed ‘reasonable’ under the
Fourth Amendment.”339
Furthermore, in Washington v. Davis,340 the Supreme Court
went so far as to acknowledge that discriminatory impact and
the “total or seriously disproportionate exclusion” of Black
people demonstrates unconstitutionality because of the
difficulty of explaining discrimination without discussing
race.341 But, for the Davis Court, that did not matter because of
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.342 According to the Supreme
Court, a law, which may be neutral on its face, is not invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because of its
disproportionate impact on a particular race.343 Additionally, in
McCleskey v. Kemp,344 Justice Powell made a point to praise
constitutional guarantees, noting that although the criminal
justice system has imperfections, constitutional guarantees can
be met when the criminal justice system is surrounded with
“safeguards” to make the justice system “as fair as possible.”345
Justice Powell completely disregarded the societal injustices
right in front of his face. He concluded that although the study
at issue in McCleskey indicated a discrepancy which showed a
correlation to race, such a discrepancy did not constitute a
systemic defect.346
The Black Fourth Amendment will encapsulate the
antiracist understanding of the Fourth Amendment, as
informed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause and the contemporary understanding of Black freedom,
since racist policing runs counter to the Equal Protection

339. Darmer, supra note 144, at 118; DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 135 (1999).
340. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
341. Id. at 242.
342. See id. (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.”).
343. See id. at 239 (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a
law or other official act, with regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact.” (emphasis in original)).
344. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
345. Id. at 313.
346. Id.
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Clause.347 Therefore, a separate judicial rule, statute, or
amendment should take place of the Fourth Amendment.
Specifically, the amendment should explicitly state that race
must be considered when assessing the officer’s subjective
intentions for why they conducted a seizure, as racist
stereotypes are completely ineradicable from any search and
seizure analysis.348 For the human brain to process information
quickly, it utilizes classifications such as race to store the
particular information.349 Therefore, when an officer is
determining whether an individual is engaging in criminal
activity, the officer quite obviously relies on the mental
classification that Black men are criminals and inherently
dangerous.
Furthermore, the Black Fourth Amendment should create
a rebuttable presumption, forcing prosecutors and the state to
prove that race was not a factor when searching and seizing
Black individuals. In creating the rebuttable presumption, the
burden will be on the prosecution and state, who will have to
produce evidence pointing to their intentions when violently
seizing Black men. This rebuttable presumption will run
counter to and combat the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,
which has set out that discriminatory impact alone is not
enough to establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.350 The Black Fourth Amendment

347. Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law
of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and
the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1048 (2010).
348. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir.
2000) (explaining that district courts must carefully examine the testimony of
police officers where it seems as if the officer is citing an area as “high-crime”
as a proxy for targeting minorities); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002) (noting that officers may make inferences from their
experiences and training when conducting a stop); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 3–4 (1985) (discussing the details of the encounter between the officer
and decedent, while leaving out any reference to the decedent’s race).
349. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 983–92 (1999) (discussing the
findings of social scientists and cognitive psychologists regarding the process
of grouping information based on characteristics of individuals).
350. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“ur cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).
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would guarantee that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
work together to deconstruct barriers erected by the Supreme
Court when alleging that race animosity was a factor in the
officers reasoning for the seizure.351
Consider the Supreme Court’s analysis in Terry, where it
wrote an opinion that was close to being devoid of any reference
to race.352 But in cases such as United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce353 and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,354 the
Court explicitly addresses race.355 Yet the Court directly
addressed race in these cases because of the calculus that plays
into catching undocumented immigrants at the border instead
of addressing the inherent racism that plagues policing in the
United States. Indisputably, the Court has addressed race in a
reasonable suspicion analysis and it is therefore not
unprecedented to more forcibly incorporate race in the
reasonable suspicion analysis. With the Black Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court must consider the racist
implications of the Fourth Amendment embedded in its
jurisprudence instead of handpicking when it wants to
incorporate a race-conscious analysis.
More narrowly, the reasonable suspicion standard under
the Fourth Amendment is one that is malleable and ductile.356
The Supreme Court has resisted defining the exact contours of
the standard.357 Therefore, reasonableness has historically
reflected political ideals as well as unconscious fears and
notions, remaining unquantified and subject to police discretion.
351. See Charles R. Lawrence II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319–21 (1987)
(criticizing the pitfalls of the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis).
352. As discussed earlier, race was only mentioned in a footnote. See supra
notes 120–123 and accompanying text.
353. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
354. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
355. See id. at 547 (noting that the passengers were Mexican);
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (same).
356. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND LAW 145 (1997).
357. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996)
(“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean
is not possible. . . . [T]he standards are ‘not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules.’ . . . They are instead fluid concepts that take their
substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are
being assessed.” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 424 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
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Because of the shaky ground of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court should create a standard
reflecting the Black Fourth Amendment. The Court should
consider the stark realities of police terror that troubles Black
communities and consider and apply the rebuttable
presumption standard that recognizes the disproportionate
impact policing has on Black individuals.358 In doing so, the
Court would reinforce the intentions of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its incorporation of the Fourth Amendment—
to provide Black individuals with the protection and guarantees
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court should pay close attention
to the harsh reality of American society: that police continually
target Black men, grounding their reasonable suspicion in skin
color.359
If the Supreme Court can adopt the exclusionary rule as it
did in Weeks v. United States—despite the exclusionary rule not
being explicitly in the Fourth Amendment—and continually
apply it to deter misconduct among police officers, then,
perhaps, it could adopt a rule that enacts and implements a
racially-conscious amendment titled the Black Fourth
Amendment.360
CONCLUSION
“Daily the Negro is coming more and more to look upon law
and justice, not as protecting safeguards, but as sources of
humiliation and oppression.”361 There has not been a time in
United States history where Black individuals have received the
same protections and guarantees of white individuals. Despite
the intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause—to ensure that policies and laws are antiracist—courts
have erroneously applied it and, ultimately, have failed to use it

358. Maclin, supra note 83, at 372.
359. See supra Part II.
360. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961) (applying the
exclusionary rule); see also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29–30 (1927)
(emphasizing that if a search is made in violation of the Constitution, then it
is not made lawful by what is discovered from the search).
361. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 106 (1903).
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as a mechanism to combat racist policing.362 Black skin
continues to serve as a proxy for police officers to stop and frisk
or search and seize Black individuals.363 Working with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Black
Fourth Amendment will serve as the catalyst for ensuring Black
individuals have protection from “back-end” racist policing
when police officers use race as a factor when determining that
someone is suspicious.364
The United States is not the land of equal protection—it is
merely the land of laws that aspire to protect minorities but are
void of racial conscious disquisition, such as the Fourth
Amendment. Consequently, police officers have the discretion to
stop Black individuals by deeming them criminals, making it
easier to arrest them. The current Fourth Amendment sits idly
and frankly runs afoul of the battle against racist policing as the
subjective intent of police officers is left out of the inquiry set
out by the courts.365 The Supreme Court and Congress bear the
responsibility of reframing the Fourth Amendment to be an
antiracist amendment that recognizes racist policing and
accomplishes what the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
do: secure equal protection and due process to Black individuals,
as well as the rest of the extended liberties and rights granted
by the Bill of Rights..366 The Black Fourth Amendment will
accomplish this by confronting the racist policing endemic in the
United States, and by valuing the humanity of Black life.

362. See Brandon Hasbrouck, The Unconstitutional Police, 56 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 239, 253 (2021) (criticizing the court’s interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
363. See supra Part II.
364. See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black
People: The Fourth Amendment Pathway to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
125, 127 (2017) (discussing the methods in which the Fourth Amendment
permits police violence).
365. See supra Part III.
366. See Alexis Hoag, Valuing Black Lives: A Case for Ending the Death
Penalty, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 983, 999 (2020) (maintaining that the
intent of the Equal Protection Clause was to ensure that Black people have
equal protection of the laws).

